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ABSTRACT 
Fast development of supercomputer and perspective quantum computer is posing increasing serious threats 
to communication security. Based on the laws of quantum mechanics, quantum communication offers 
provable security of communication, and is a promising solution to counter such threats. Quantum secure 
direct communication (QSDC) is one of the important branches of quantum communication. Different from 
other branches of quantum communication, it transmits secret information directly. Recently, remarkable 
progress has been made in the proof-of-principle experimental demonstrations of QSDC. However, it 
remains a technical feast to march QSDC into practical application. Here, we report an implementation of 
practical quantum secure communication system. The security is analyzed in the Wyner wiretap channel 
theory. The system uses a coding scheme based on concatenation of low density parity check (LDPC) codes, 
which works in a regime with realistic environment of high noise and high loss. The present system operates 
with a repetition rate of 1 MHz, and at a distance of 1.5 kilometers. The secure communication rate is 50 
bps, which can effectively send text message and files such as image and sounds with a reasonable size. 
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 INTRODUCTION 
Economic, political, and social well-being in the world depend crucially on secure communication 
infrastructures. Present communication is secured through encryption techniques, relying on pre-shared key 
and cryptographic protocols built from the computational difficulty of certain mathematical problems, for 
instance the RSA public key scheme1. There are potential dangers with the present secure communication 
system. On one hand, these cryptographic protocols are based on mathematical difficult problems that are not 
rigorously proven to have no efficient algorithms. These protocols may be broken one day, or might have been 
broken already privately, by some genius, as we do not yet know if efficient algorithm for solving these 
problems exists or not. On the other hand, with the fast development of super computers, and the perspective 
of practical quantum computer, some cryptography may become insecure2. Different from those cryptographic 
algorithms, physical-layer security is based on information theory rather than computational complexity. In 
1975, Wyner presented the degraded wiretap channel model3. The secrecy capacity was defined as the 
supremum of all the achievable secure and reliable transmission rates. For classical communication, the 
estimation of the secrecy capacity in practical communication system is hard, because it is difficult for the 
legitimate parties to detect eavesdropping. When quantum systems, such as single photons or entangled photon 
pairs are used to transmit digital information, quantum physics principle gives rise to novel phenomena 
unachievable with classical transmission media4. It is impossible in principle to eavesdrop without disturbing 
the transmission to avoid detection. The pioneering work of Bennett and Brassard (BB84)5 showed how to 
exploit quantum resources for random key agreement with high security using quantum key distribution 
technique. Quantum key distribution5-9 distributes random key, rather than the information itself, and the 
information is sent through another classical communication. 
In 2000, quantum secure direct communication (QSDC) was proposed, and it can transfer information directly 
without key distribution10-12, which eliminates further security loopholes associated with key storage and 
ciphertext attacks13,14, offering a new tool for selection in the zoo of secure communication protocols. Recently, 
experiments were reported of proof-of-principle demonstrations of QSDC based on single photons15 and 
entanglement16,17. In particular, Zhang et al17 demonstrated QSDC in a fiber with a distance of 500 meters 
using the two-step QSDC protocols10,11. 
Here, we report an experimental implementation of practical quantum secure communication system using a 
protocol based on the DL04 protocol12. To move QSDC forward into practical application, a number of key 
issues have to be solved. Security analysis of information transmission is crucial for practical application. 
According to Wyner’s wiretap model, it is essential to let the system work with a capacity below the secrecy 
capacity of the channel. We estimated the secrecy capacity using the error rate from the sampling checking 
process of the system. Once this secrecy capacity estimation is completed, it is possible to design a coding 
scheme with a communication rate smaller than this secrecy capacity. We developed a coding scheme based 
on the concatenation of low density parity check (LDPC) codes18,19, which is specifically designed for 
operating at the high loss and high error rate regime, unique for quantum communication. The platform shows 
that our implementation can effectively work in such realistic environment. In our system, the single photon 
source used is the attenuated faint laser pulse, and the repetition rate is 1  MHz.  The distance is 1.5 
kilometers, and the achieved secure information transmission rate is 50 bps, which is able to transmit text 
message and image or sound files of reasonable size.  
RESULTS 
1）Practical DL04-QSDC (PDL-04 QSDC) protocol 
(1) Our practical quantum secure direct communication scheme is based on the DL04 QSDC protocol using 
single-photons12. The scheme is illustrated in details in Fig.1. It contains four steps. A legitimate 
information receiver, Bob, prepares a sequence of qubits, each randomly in one of the four states 0 , 1 , 
+  and − . Then he sends the sequence of states to the information sender, Alice. 0 ,
 
1
 
are the 
eigenstates of Pauli operator Z, and +  and −  are the eigenstates of Pauli operator X.  
(2) Upon receiving the sequence of single photons, Alice chooses randomly some of them and measures them 
randomly in the Z-basis or the X-basis. She publishes the positions, the measuring-basis and measurement 
results of those single photons. Upon these information, Bob compares with his preparations of these states, 
and estimates the bit error rate of the Bob-to-Alice channel, and informs Alice through a broadcast channel. 
Thus, Alice can estimate the maximum secrecy capacity Cs of the Bob-to-Alice channel using the wiretap 
channel theory. If the secrecy capacity is nonzero, then go to the next step. If the secrecy capacity Cs is 
zero, they conclude the channel is insecure and terminate the process. 
(3) Alice chooses a coding scheme with a transmission rate that does not exceed Cs on the remaining qubits, 
to transmit secret information securely and reliably. She encodes a block of message to a code word with 
a LDPC code which will be described later. The basic operations are the following two unitary 
operations, 
0 0 1 1I = +
，
1 0 0 1Y = −
， 
mapping to ‘0’ and ‘1’ respectively， and they are further used for constructing the code words. Then she 
sends them back to Bob. To check eavesdropping in the channel from Alice to Bob, Alice also encodes 
some random numbers randomly in the encoded message sequence. 
(4) Bob can deterministically decode Alice’s message from his received signals by measuring the qubits in 
the same basis he prepared them. If the error rate is below the correcting capability of the LDPC code, the 
transmission is successful. Then they start from step (1) again to send another part of the secret message 
until they complete the transmission of the whole message. If the error rate is bigger than the correcting 
capability of the LDPC code, they stop the process. 
 Figure 1. Illustration of the PDL04-QSDC protocol. 
2) Security analysis 
According to Wyner’s wiretap channel theory3, the secrecy capacity is 
        
{ }
max{ ( : ) ( : )}s
p
C I A B I A E= − ,                                                  (1) 
where I(A:B) and I(A:E) are the mutual information between Alice and Bob, and Alice and Eve respectively. 
Moreover, I(A:E) represents the maximum information that an eavesdropper can obtain, using the best strategy 
she can. 
The state Bob prepared is a complete mixed state ( )0 0 1 1 / 2 = + , because he prepares with equal 
probability the four states, 0 , 1 , + , − . We consider the case of collective attack. The most general 
quantum operation which Eve may perform in the forward Bob-to-Alice channel consists of a joint operation 
on the qubit and some ancilla that belong to Eve, 
            ( )BE U U    +=  ,                                                   (2) 
where   represents Eve’s ancillary state and U is a unitary operation acting on the joint space of the ancilla 
and the qubit. Then, Eve resends the qubit to Alice and stores her ancilla until the qubit is sent back. Alice 
performs an operation, I with probability p or Y with probability 1 - p. After operating by Alice, the state 
becomes 
            0 1(1 )
ABE BE BEp p  =  + −  ,                                                (3) 
where 0
BE BEI I =  and 1
BE BEY Y  += . To gain Alice’s  information, Eve has to distinguish Alice’s 
encoded qubit 0
BE  from 1
BE  by performing coherent measurements on any number of qubits and ancilla. 
The maximum mutual information between Alice and Eve is 
            
0 1
{ }
( : ) max{ ( ) ( ) (1 ) ( )}ABE BE BE
U
I A E S p S p S   −  − −  ,                               (4) 
where ( )S  is the von Neumann entropy20. We obtain the maximum of mutual information between Alice 
and Eve (the detailed derivation is given in supplementary information), 
                 ( : ) ( )I A E h  ,                                                      (5) 
where ( )2 2 21 (1 2 ) (1 2 2 ) [1 (1 2 ) ] / 2x zp e e p = − − + − − − −  , ex and ez are the bit error rates in X-basis and Z-
basis in the error-check respectively, and 
2 2( ) log (1 ) log (1 )h x x x x x= − − − −  is the binary Shannon entropy.  
Because of imperfect efficiency of the detectors and channel loss, Bob cannot receive all the qubits. Gottesman 
has proven the security of Bennet-Brassard quantum key distribution protocol in the case where the source 
and detector are under the limited control of an adversary21. Similarly, considering the detectors and channel 
loss, the maximum mutual information between Alice and Eve becomes 
             ( : ) ( )EveI A E Q h   ,                                                       (6) 
where QEve is the maximum rate Eve can access the qubits.  
The main channel can be modeled as a cascaded channel, which consists of a binary symmetric channel and a 
binary erasure channel in series22, so that the mutual information between Alice and Bob is, 
      ( : ) [ ( 2 ) ( )]BobI A B Q h p e pe h e=  + − − ,                                                (7) 
where QBob is the receipt rate in Bob’s side, and e is the bit error rate between Alice and Bob. We can estimate 
the lower bound of the secrecy capacity, 
      
{ }
{ }
max{ ( : ) ( : )}
max{ [ ( 2 ) ( )] ( )}
[1 ( )] ( )
[1 ( ) ( )]
s
p
Bob Eve
p
Bob Eve
x z
Bob
x z
C I A B I A E
Q h p e pe h e Q h
Q h e Q h e e
Q h e g h e e

= −
=  + − − − 
=  − −  +
=  − −  +
                                       (8) 
where g represents the gap between QEve and QBob, depending on the back channel loss and the efficiency of 
detector.  
For any wiretap channel, if the secrecy capacity is non-zero, i.e., the legitimate receiver has a better channel 
than the eavesdropper, there exists some coding scheme that achieve perfect secrecy23, such as two edge type 
LDPC codes based on coset encoding scheme24.  
3) Experimental results 
We implemented the above scheme in fiber system with phase coding25，the details of the experimental setup 
and methods are given in the material and method section. In our experiment, we initially set the distance at 
1.5 km, which is a typical distance between different buildings of a secure area. Fig. 2 shows the error rates at 
Alice’s and Bob’s sites. In Alice’s site, ex and ez are the error rates of measurements using the X-basis and Z-
basis respectively. We estimate the error rate block by block, and each block contains 1312  830= 1,088,960 
pulses. In Fig.2, the horizontal axis is labeled against the number of blocks processed. Under normal working 
conditions, their values are about 0.8%. In Bob’s site, of the pulses he sends to Alice previously, he receives 
0.3% of them, namely for every 1000 pulses, 3 photon counts can be obtained when Bob measures the returned 
pulses. The error rate at Bob’s site is smaller than those in Alice’s site, due to the intrinsic robustness of the 
retrace-structure of light, usually about 0.6%. Here, the mean photon number is 0.1. The inherent loss of 
quantum channel is 14.5 dB, which includes the efficiency of the detector, about 70 %, and the optical elements, 
about 13 dB. Because the mean photon number is 0.1 and the channel loss of 1.5 kilometers fiber is 0.6 dB, 
this gives the total loss of the system as 25.1 dB. Shown in Fig.3, the mutual information I(A:B) and I(A:E) 
versus the loss of the system are two straight lines. The area between these two lines are the information-
theoretic secure area, namely, if a coding scheme with an information rate within these areas, it will guarantee 
the security reliably. The error rates are set at values as above, namely e is 0.6 %, ex and ez are 0.8 %. The 
secrecy capacity can be estimated as 0.00184 for loss at 25.1 dB. For the number of N in the pseudo-random 
sequence, we set it to N = 830, after optimization. Together with the chosen LDPC code, our coding scheme 
gives a transmission rate 0.00096, when the bit error rate is chosen as 10-6. Meanwhile, 
4( : ) ( ) 9.1 10Bob x zI A E g Q h e e
−=   + =  , where the loss of the back channel, includes the efficiency of the detector 
and channel loss, is about 4.1 dB, so that g = 2.57. This gives a secure information rate of 50 bps, which is 
well-within the secure area in Fig.3. 
 
Figure 2. System stability with different message block. ex and ez are the error rates of measurements using 
the X-basis and Z-basis respectively, in Alice’s site. e is the error rate at Bob’s site. We estimate the error rate 
block by block, and each block contains 1312×830 pulses. The mean photon number is 0.1. The inherent loss 
of quantum channel is 14.5 dB, which includes the efficiency of the detector, about 70 %, and the optical 
elements, about 13 dB. The total loss of the system is 25.1 dB, with distance of 1.5 kilometers. 
 Figure 3. The solid line represents the mutual information between Alice and Bob, the capacity of main 
channel. For secure transmission, the information rate cannot exceed it. The dotted line is the mutual 
information between Alice and Eve, the maximum information that an eavesdropper can obtain. The error 
rates are set at values as above, namely e is 0.6 %, ex and ez are 0.8 %. Symbols represent experimental results. 
We set the length of pseudo-random sequence as 830. Together with the chosen LDPC code, our coding 
scheme gives a transmission rate 0.00096 when the bit error rate is under 10-6. As it is greater than the mutual 
information between Alice and Eve, both the security and reliability of the information transmission are 
assured. 
DISCUSSION 
It is well-known that in quantum communication, the photon loss is tremendous, due to inefficient photon 
source, high channel loss and low efficiency detector. Traditional error-correcting coding is usually designed 
for working in the low-loss and low-noise regime, and it cannot be used for our purpose. To guarantee the 
reliability and security of transmission for QSDC, we designed a coding scheme based on the concatenation 
of Low-Density Parity-Check (LDPC) codes, and pseudo random sequence, with the preprocessing based on 
the universal hashing families (UHF)26. For each message block m, Alice generates a sequence of random bits, 
which is denoted as r, of length k. Then, she maps (m, r) to a new vector u by UHF, and encodes the vector u 
to v of length l, using the generator matrix of a specified LDPC code. Alice maps each coded bit to sequence 
of length N to obtain a transmitted sequence of length Nl, which is transmitted over the quantum channel. 
After receiving the modulated pulses from Alice, Bob makes measurement in the same basis as he prepared 
them. Though only a fraction of photons in a pseudo random sequence can reach Bob’s site, he can still read 
out the coded bit by looking at the log-likelihood ratios of each coded bit calculated from the received sequence. 
Then, he decodes the LDPC code by an iterative propagation decoding algorithm with the log-likelihood ratios. 
Information theoretic security can be guaranteed27, as long as ( : ) / ( )I A E k N l  . 
 MATERIALS AND METHODS 
The experimental setup is shown in Fig. 4. Bob prepares a sequence of single photon pulses. After polarization 
control and attenuation, it goes to the Mach-Zehnder ring where a random phase of the value of 0, /2,  and 
3/2, is encoded, which is equivalent to preparing qubit randomly  in 0 , ( )0 1 / 2+ , 1   and 
( )0 1 / 2−   state respectively. Then it is sent to Alice’s site through a fiber of 1.5 km long.  After 
arriving at Alice’s site, it is separated into two parts, one goes to the encoding module, and the other goes to 
the control module. In the control module, the qubits are measured, and the results are compared with Bob 
through the classical communication line connecting the two FPGAs shown at the bottom of Fig.4. At the 
same time, encoding is performed in the encoding-module. If the error rate is smaller than the threshold, the 
encoding part is allowed to send the single photons back to Bob, through the same fiber, and then are guided 
to the single photon detectors where they are measured. The three phase modulators, the single photon 
detectors, and the encoding of messages are controlled by the FPGAs at the two sites, which are further 
controlled by upper-position computers. 
 
Figure 4. Experiment setup. A strongly attenuated 1550 nm laser is used as an approximate single-photon 
source with systematic pulse repetition frequency of 1 MHz. Bob sends the single photons in a superposition 
of two time-bins with a relative phase to Alice, and Alice randomly chooses one of two possible tasks, error-
check or coding. Both sides are each controlled by a field programmable gate array (FPGA), and the operation 
of the four states of single photon is realized with a commercial lithium niobate modulator (PM, phase 
modulator). PC, polarization controller. PBS, polarization beam splitter. ATT, attenuator. CIR, optical 
circulator. FC, fiber coupler. SPD, Single photon detector. PMFC, polarization maintaining filter coupler. FR, 
Faraday Rotator. 
 The advantage of such forward-backward routing of the photon pulses is the automatic compensation of drift 
of polarizations of the time-bin pulses, because they exchange their routes after reflected by the Faraday rotator 
at Alice’s site. This automatic compensation design was proposed by Martilelli28, and has also been used in 
the plug-play QKD system29. The major difference between the plug-play QKD29 scheme and DL04-based 
schemes, such as Refs. 7,12,15 and this PDL04-QSDC scheme is in the strength of light pulses in the forward 
channel. In Refs. 7,12,15, single photons are used in both the forward and backward channels, whereas in 
plug-play QKD29 the forward channel uses strong classical light pulse, only the Alice to Bob backward channel 
uses single photon pulses. This mechanism of automatic compensation of polarization fluctuation enhances 
greatly the interference and leads to high visibility30. However, in the check-module of our system, such 
retrace-light circuit is not applicable, and active polarization, namely one monitors the drift and forcibly 
restore them when it reaches a value, has to be used. As a result, the error rate in the check-mode is usually 
higher than that in the communication-mode. 
In summary, we have implemented a full practical quantum secure direct communication system with realistic 
environment of high noise and high loss. To combat error and loss, LDPC code and pseudo-random sequence 
techniques are applied. The security of the system is analyzed in details using the wiretap channel theory. 
Given the error rates, the secrecy capacity of the channel can be estimated. When the secrecy capacity is 
nonzero, a coding scheme with an information rate less than the secrecy capacity will ensure both the security 
of the information transmission and reliability of the information transmission. At a practical meaningful 
distance of 1.5 kilometers, a secure information rate of 50 bps is achieved. These parameters are premature, 
and there is much room for improvement. With current technology, an information rate of a dozens of kbps is 
achievable. 
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The maximum mutual information between Alice and Eve can be calculated as follows 
0 1
{ }
( : ) max{ ( ) ( ) (1 ) ( )}ABE BE BE
U
I A E S p S p S   −  − −  , 
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Since 0
BE and 1
BE  only differs from     by some unitary transformation,  
0 1( ) ( ) ( ) 1
BE BES S S  = = = . 
Hence, 
{ }
( : ) max{ ( )} 1ABE
U
I A E S  − . 
The effect of the unitary operation may be represented as 
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Unitarity is guaranteed if the following conditions are satisfied, 
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The corresponding Gram matrix  of ABE  is explicitly written as [1], 
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where 01 00Im( )  = , 10 11Im( )  = , 01 10 00 11=    − . 
The eigenvalues of G are given by 
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2 2
=
U     
       
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+ − − − − +
= + + −
+ + −
 
In error-check, these parameters should be constrained by the error rates of X-basis and Z-basis, 
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It is easy to see that ( )
ABES   is monotonically decreasing with 1  and 2 . Therefore, it takes its maximum 
at 1 0 =  and 2 1 2 2x ze e = − − . Thus, 
( ) 1 ( )ABES h = +  
where ( )2 2 21 (1 2 ) (1 2 2 ) [1 (1 2 ) ] / 2x zp e e p = − − + − − − −  and 2 2( ) log (1 ) log (1 )h x x x x x= − − − −  
is the binary Shannon entropy. This attack satisfies the following equation: 
00 01 11 10
10 01
00 11
0
1 2
z
x z
e
e e
   
 
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= =
=
= − −
 
The maximum of mutual information between Alice and Eve is ( : ) ( )I A E h  . 
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